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ORIGINALISM:  
A THING WORTH DOING . . . 
D. A. Jeremy Telman* 
 
 Originalism in constitutional interpretation continues to 
grow in its reach, its sophistication, its practical applicability and 
its popular support.  Originally conceived as a doctrine of judicial 
modesty, originalist judges are now far more confident in their 
ability to discern the Constitution’s original meaning and to strike 
down legislative enactments inconsistent with that meaning.  Two 
aphorisms by the leading practitioners of originalism sum up 
originalism’s journey.  Justice Scalia, writing in the 1980s, 
conceded that originalism was merely “the lesser evil” and 
consoled himself with the Chestertonian dictum that “a thing 
worth doing is worth doing badly.”  Justice Thomas places fewer 
limitations on his own belief in originalist method and adopts as 
his motto “anything worth doing is worth doing right.”  The 
challenge for contemporary originalism is that it is not the sort of 
thing that G.K. Chesterton thought was worth doing badly, but it 
also may be the sort of thing that is very difficult to do right. 
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I. Introduction: Originalism and Its 
Discontents 
This Article presents a slice of a larger project with the 
working title “Originalism and Its Discontents.”  The title alludes 
to Freud’s classic sociological work, Civilization and Its 
Discontents.1  Freud there contended that there is an inescapable 
malaise associated with human psychology2 – although we strive 
for happiness,3 we suffer continuously from feelings of frustration 
and incompletion, even as our cultural and technological 
accomplishments mount.4 We mistake absences for losses and thus 
feel perpetually cheated out of what we never had.5   
I contend that a similar sociological phenomenon underlies the 
movement that favors originalism in constitutional interpretation.  
We see the familiar confusion between absences and losses in the 
titles of some classics of originalist scholarship, such as Robert 
                                                        
1  SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (James Strachey, 
transl., 1961).  Freud insists that Civilization and Its Discontents is not a work of 
psychoanalysis, and he claims not to shares with his readers any insights drawn 
from psychoanalysis until Chapter 7.  Id. at 90 (“And here at last an idea comes 
in which belongs entirely to psycho-analyasis and which is foreign to people’s 
ordinary way of thinking.”).  See Leo Bersani, Speaking Psycholanalysis, in 
WHOSE FREUD? THE PLACE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 
(Peter Brooks & Alex Woloch, eds., 2000) [hereinafter WHOSE FREUD?] 154, 
154-55 (characterizing Freud as complaining that the argument of Civilization 
and Its Discontents largely derives from information that is “universally known” 
and does not rely on the insights of pyschoanalysis). 
2  See, e.g., FREUD, CIVILIZATION, at 20 (arguing that people seek solace in 
religion in order to escape the feelings of helplessness they experience as 
infants); id. at 26, 37 (contending that humans’ ability to experience happiness 
bumps up against three insuperable barriers: nature’s superior powers, our own 
bodily feebleness, and other people). 
3 See id. at 25 (contending that people strive for happiness and that “purpose of 
life is simply the programme of the pleasure principle”). 
4 Id. at 44-45 (observing that even as we attain an almost god-like character we 
remain unhappy). 
5 For an extended discussion of the complicated relationship between absence 
and loss, see Dominick LaCapra, Reflections on Trauma, Absence, and Loss, in 
WHOSE FREUD, at 178-204 (treating the relationship of absence and loss as akin 
to that between structural and historical trauma).   
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Bork’s A Country I Do Not Recognize 6  and Randy Barnett’s 
Restoring the Lost Constitution.7  The question at the heart of the 
project of which this Article is a part is why originalism arose 
when it did in the 1960s and why it has had such appeal beyond the 
legal profession and the legal academy and grown into a cultural 
movement that is still going as strong as ever half a century later.  
While this Article hopes to shed some light on the broader issue, 
the focus here is on the practice of originalism in constitutional 
interpretation in the early 21st century.  
This Article will proceed as follows.  In Part II, I briefly sketch 
the history of originalism since the 1960s by highlighting what I 
regard as the two most striking developments in originalist 
methodology. Part III sketches what is in my view the unavoidable 
tension between the compelling and perhaps even inescapable 
logic of the originalist credo and its epistemological limits.  In Part 
IV, I highlight these epistemological limits in the work of two of 
originalism’s greatest contemporary practitioners, Justices Scalia 
and Thomas. Part V concludes with some thoughts about what lies 
ahead for originalism. 
What follows is neither a defense of nor an attack on 
originalism. My purpose is not to dethrone originalism, which 
some now consider the dominant mode of constitutional 
interpretation, and propose an alternative.  Rather, I am working as 
an intellectual historian to understand the currents that underlie a 
cultural moment and to highlight its accomplishments as well as 
the challenges that it faces.  Much of what follows is critical of 
originalism, but pointing out the limitations of a theory is not the 
same as suggesting that it is obsolete or that the alternatives are 
preferable. 
                                                        
6  ROBERT H. BORK (ed.), A COUNTRY I DO NOT RECOGNIZE: THE LEGAL 
ASSAULT ON AMERICAN VALUES (2005) [herinafter A COUNTRY]; see also 
ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM 
AND AMERICAN DECLINE (1996). 
7 RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PREUMPTION 
OF LIBERTY (Rev’d ed. 2013).  
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II. Originalism’s Journey 
This argument of this section is simple.  First, the history of 
originalism shows that this approach is a 20th-century innovation in 
constitutional interpretation, and it has developed and changed 
very rapidly in the half-century since it was first articulated as a 
radical departure from the dominant approach to constitutional 
adjudication of the 1960s and 70s.  Second, as originalism has 
grown in sophisticatation and persuasive power, it has also become 
more self-confident.  As a consequence of that confidence, 
contemporary originalism no longer eschews judicial activism, 
opposition to which inspired the early originalists.  Rather, 
contemporary originalists at times embrace activism and urge 
judges to reject legislative enactments that they believe exceed 
legislative power according to the Constitution’s original meaning.  
Two important aphorisms by the two leading practitioners of 
Originalism capture this second, less appreciated development in 
Originalism.  Justice Antonin Scalia’s defense of originalism relied 
crucially on his argument that “a thing worth doing is worth doing 
badly,” 8 a motto that captures early originalism’s self-
consciousness of its own limitations as a methodology of 
constitutional interpretation.  Justice Clarence Thomas counters in 
his autobiography with his own motto: “Any job worth doing is 
worth doing right.” 9  Justice Thomas’s motto articulates the self-
confidence with which originalist scholars and judges, including 
Justice Scalia, currently proceed.  However, while Justice 
Thomas’s motto better captures the originalist movement in its 
present form, this Article illustrates (in Part IV) through a close 
reading of the two Justices’ originalist slogans that Justice Scalia’s 
motto is more in keeping with the modest capabilities of originalist 
jurisprudence. 
A. Originalism’s Precursors 
 
                                                        
8 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U CIN. L. Rev. 849, 863 
(1989). 
9 CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR 38, 424 (2007). 
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Originalism seems obvious and inescapable to us now, but it 
was almost unheard of until the 1960s. Contemporary originalism 
had its antecedents in the Four Horsemen of the judicial reaction 
during the Lochner era.10  According to legal historian G. Edward 
White, the jurisprudence of those who resisted the New Deal 
entailed the view that: 
[T]he Constitution was not designed to change with time.  Its 
principles were universal, and thus its “meaning” at a 
generalized level was fixed.  Its structure and language were not 
altered by events but accommodated events.  Events were seen 
as precipitating restatements of fundamental constitutional 
principles.11 
 
But the jurisprudence of the Four Horsemen did not command a 
stable majority even during the Lochner era.  In holding that 
federal authority pursuant to the Article II treaty power could 
exceed that of Congress alone in Missouri v. Holland in 1920, 
Justice Holmes composed on behalf of seven Justices the following 
hymn to living constitutionalism: 
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, 
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that 
they have called into life a being the development of which 
could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its 
begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they 
had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their 
successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a 
nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our 
                                                        
10 The “Four Horsemen” label did not become common until the 1950s.  G. 
EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000), 285.  Barry 
Cushman, a leading historian of the New Deal, sets out a caricatured narrative of 
the “switch in time” in which he describes the Four Horsemen (Justices Van 
Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland an Butler) as pursuing a jurisprudence 
“driven by their devotion to the anachronistic tenets of laissez-faire economics 
and their sympathetic subservience to the interests of rich and powerful people 
and institutions.”  BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE 
STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 3 (1998). Cushman has 
promoted a far more nuanced assessment of the “Four Horsemen,” noting that 
they were by no means united on all issues, nor were their votes always best 
understood as promoting political conservatism.  See Barry Cushman, The 
Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 VIRG. L. REV. 559 (1997). 
11 WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 205. 
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whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a 
hundred years ago.12  
 
Justice Holmes’s words, perhaps because they are Justice 
Holmes’s words, exude self-confidence and serenity, as though he 
were merely reminding his readers of truths as self evident as those 
enumerated in the Declaration of Independence.  Two dissenting 
Justices filed no opinion.   
The New Deal Supreme Court extended this outlook as early as 
1934,13 when Chief Justice Hughes upheld a state law that enabled 
courts to postpone mortgage deadlines in the face of a challenge 
based on the Constitution’s Contracts Clause. 14   Chief Justice 
Hughes was well aware that the Contracts Clause was enacted to 
prevent states from passing legislation just like that being 
challenged. 15   Invoking Chief Justice John Marshall’s famous 
reminder that “we must never forget that it is a constitution we are 
expounding,”16 Chief Justice Hughes rejected the notion that “the 
great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the 
interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook 
of their time, would have placed upon them.”17  If the “meaning” 
of the Contracts Clause entails “the social implications of its 
application,” then the mortgage crisis of the 1930s was not the 
same as the debt crisis that the Framers contemplated when they 
ratified the Constitution. 18   Not surprisingly, Justice Sutherland 
wrote a vigorous dissent, in which the other three Horsemen 
joined.19 
                                                        
12 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) 
13 Home Bulding & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
14 See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10 (“No State shall . . . impair the Obligation of 
Contracts.”). 
15 See WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL at 212 (noting that the 
“Contracts Clause was unambiguously designed to prevent the very legislative 
intervention being challenged” in the case). 
16 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 315, 415 (1816) 
17 Home Bulding & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934). 
18 WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL at 214.  
19 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 448-49 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (“A provision of the 
Constitution, it is hardly necessary to say, does not admit of two distinctly 
opposite interpretations.  It does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely 
different thing at another time.”). 
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According to Noah Feldman, Justice Hugo Black was the first 
“to frame originalism as a definitive constitutional theory.”  
Feldman calls Justice Black “the inventor of originalism.” 20  
Justice Black called version his version of originalism “absolutist” 
on the subject of individual rights.21 Unlike the academics who 
popularized originalism in the 1960s and 1970, he is generally 
considered to have been a liberal Justice and often considered an 
activist,22 in that he would not hesitate to vote down legislation that 
violated his understanding of the Constitution’s meaning.23 While 
he certainly adhered to the notion that fidelity to the written 
                                                        
20 NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 145 (2010). 
21 The term derives from Black’s inaugural James Madison lecture at NYU in 
1960 in which he stated, “It is my belief that there are ‘absolutes’ in our Bill of 
Rights, and that they were put there by men who knew what words meant, and 
meant their prohibitions to be ‘absolute.’”   ROBERT K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: 
A BIOGRAPHY 492 (1994); See also HOWARD BALL, HUGO L. BLACK: COLD 
STEEL WARRIOR 122-123 (stressing Justice Black’s belief in the need for courts 
to invalidate legislative enactments that threatened individual liberties). 
22  See Arthur J. Goldberg, Attorney General Meese vs. Chief Justice John 
Marshall and Justice Hugo L. Black, 185, 193, in JUSTICE HUGO BLACK AND 
MODERN AMERICA (Tony Freyer, ed., 1990) [hereinafer FREYER] (calling into 
question characterizations of Justices as “liberal” or “conservative” but referring 
to Justice Black as “that outstanding ‘liberal’ jurist”); Akhil Amar, America's 
Constitution and the Yale School of Constitutional Interpretation, 115 YALE L.J. 
1997, 2008 n.33 (2006) (describing Justice Black as “a liberal lion and a 
confessed textualist-originalist”).  Justice Black himself would not have 
appreciated the “activist” label.  He considered the Lochner era, during which 
the courts struck down business regulation, as a regrettable period of activism.  
See Goldberg, in FREYER, at 193 (citing Justice Black’s opinion in Ferguson v. 
Skrupa, 372, U.S. 726, 731-32)).  
23 Some prominent example of Justice Black’s use of originalism include: In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (contending that the 
Constitution does not require that states apply the “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard in criminal cases); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 7-18 (1964) 
(construing Article I, § 2 of the Constitution, with the help of historical materials 
from the period of the 1787 Constitutional Convention, to require that electoral 
districts have similar populations within a given state); Adamson v. Califfornia, 
332 U.S. 46, 74-78, 92-122 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (contending that the 
14th Amendment was intended to make the Bill of Rights applicable against the 
States and appending an appendix chronicling the Amendment’s history). See 
also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 2 (1980) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST] (recognizing Justice 
Black as the quintessential originalist). 
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constitution was a mechanism for restraining judicial activism,24 
his voting record is hard to reconcile with some versions of 
contemporary originalism.25  Moreover, he was an outlier in his 
jurisprudential approach throughout his time on the Court.  His 
originalism did not sway others.26   
The current vogue for originalism thus did not originate in the 
minds of our 18th-century Framers.27  Leaders of the new Republic 
did not contemplate originalism for many reasons, but the most 
obvious is that the source materials that make originalism possible 
were not available to them. George Washington held on to the 
official record of the debates, which is incomplete, and eventually 
handed them over to John Quincy Adams, who published them in 
1819. 28 That document was edited and more widely circulated in 
1830.29 James Madison’s influential account of the Constitutional 
                                                        
24 See NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK, at 349 (describing the aim of limiting judicial 
discretion as being the root of Justice Black’s judicial tree). 
25  See Goldberg, Attorney General Meese, at 185-89 (contrasting Attorney 
General Meese’s originalist opposition to incorporation through the 14th 
Amendment with Justice Black’s originalist insistence on incorporation). 
26 See Anthony Lewis, Justice Black and the First Amendment, in FREYER, at 
237, 237-38 (suggesting that Justice Black wrote for the majority in only one 
First Amendment case); id. at 251 (“The fact is Justice Black’s oft-proclaimed 
belief in First Amendment absolutes never commended itself to a majroity of his 
colleagues.”). 
27 See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1185, 1194–96 (noting that various  contemporary methods of non-originalist 
constitutional interpretation are rooted in traditions that extend back to the time 
of the adoption of the Constitution and were employed by Justice John 
Marshall); Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J. 
L. PUB. POL’Y 907, 908 (2008) (citing Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: 
It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6) (2006)) (“The idea of originalism 
as an exclusive theory, as the criterion for measuring constitutional decisions, 
ermeged only in the 1970s and 1980s.”); Keith E. Whittington, The New 
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 (2004) (conceding that, for 
much of U.S. history, originalism “was not a terribly self-conscious theory of 
constitutional interpretation”). 
28 See Mary Sarah Bilder, How Bad Were the Official Records of the Federal 
Convention? 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1620, 1663-1680 (2012) (recounting 
batlles during the Washington administration over the meaning of the 
Constitution and the struggle over the extent to which the men involved in the 
Convention could rely on the written record of that Convention). 
29 Id. at 1623. 
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Convention was first published in 1840. 30   The first scholarly 
edition of the Convention did not appear until 1911.31  Powerful 
criticisms have been raised with respect to the accuracy of 
Madison’s account32 and as to the scholarly neglect of the official 
records of the Constitutional Convention. 33   Such accounts are 
most relevant to intentionalists and since, as we shall see, most 
21st-century originalists are more concerned with original public 
meaning than they are with original intent, the more important 
documents relate not to the drafting of the Constitution in 
Philadelphia but to its ratification in the several States.   
But there the situation is no better.  The first comprehensive 
scholarly account of the ratification was published in 2010. 34   
Even today, the documentary record relating to ratification is 
incomplete. 35   We have detailed records of some ratification 
assemblies and almost none relating to others. 36   The situation for 
the Bill of Rights is far worse, as the final text was the product of a 
                                                        
30 JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Gordon 
Lloyd, ed., 2015). 
31  THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911). 
32  See MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (2015) (contending that Madison revised his 
account of the Convention in the years after the Convention to reflect his 
evolving views of the Constitution in action and of the men responsible for 
drafting it). 
33 See Bilder, How Bad? 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. at 1623 (2012) (defending the 
usefulness of the official records and the competence of the recording secretary 
against Max Farrand’s assessment that the records are flawed and the secretary 
incompetentd). 
34  PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION 
1787-1788  (2010).  See id. at x (discussing previous scholarship on ratification, 
the best of which consisted of two edited collections that appeared in 1988 and 
1989 but which devoted separate chapters to the ratification process in each state 
and thus missed part of the story). 
35 See id. at xiii-xiv (describing the way Federalists conspired to create a one-
sided record of the ratification debates that favored their perspective). 
36  See id. at xii (noting that in the 21-volume collection, The Documentary 
History of the Ratification of the Constitution, the records for Delaware, New 
Jersey, Georgia and Connecticut take up one volume, while four volumes are 
devoted to Virginia and five to New York). 
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committee that kept no minutes of its proceedings and of a vote in 
the Senate, whose deliberations were secret by design.37  
If it claims to be the original understanding of the Framers, 
originalism is a twentieth-century invention, not without its 
historical antecedents, but not realized as a comprehensive 
approach to interpretation until about 200 years after the Framing.  
Justice Scalia acknowledged as much:  
It would be hard to count on the fingers of both hands and the 
toes of both feet, yea, even on the hairs of one's youthful head, 
the opinions that have in fact been rendered not on the basis of 
what the Constitution originally meant, but on the basis of what 
the judges currently thought it desirable for it to mean.38 
 
We do not even know whether the Framers, had the question been 
put to them, would have wanted their intentions or their 
understandings to govern our approach to constitutional 
conundrums that the Framers could not have contemplated.  That 
is, we do not know whether originalism was originally intended. 
B. From Intentionalism to Textualism 
 
Scholarship on originalism in constitutional interpretation 
routinely notes one important development of originalist theory.  
Early originalist scholars saw it as their task to divine the 
intentions of the drafters of the Constitution.  Later originalists 
shifted their focus to the understandings of the men who ratified 
it.  Finally, textualist originalists attempt to discern the original 
public meaning of the document as adopted; that is, these 
textualists maintain that the Constitution ought to be understood as 
                                                        
37 See RICHARD LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS 234 (2006) (noting that “little is known about the debate” in the 
Senate that winnowed the Bill of Rights down from 17 Amendments to 12 
because “the Senate met behind closed doors until 1794, and thus the record of 
their discussion is sparce”).  
38 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U CIN. L. Rev. 849, 852 
(1989). 
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meaning what its original intended audience understood it to 
mean.39   
Originalism, as an academic movement in constitutional 
interpretation with a popular following, began as a response to the 
Warren and Burger Courts. 40  Judge Robert Bork’s contribution 
was to expand upon Herbert Wechsler’s “neutral principles” 
approach. In Bork’s view, the judge’s task was to apply “neutral 
principles” articulated in the Constitution.41  Originalism was at 
this point a reactive theory that sought to reign in judicial activism 
by forcing judicial attention to the original meaning of the 
Constitution.42  As Judge Bork explained, 
Though there have been instances of judicial perversity 
throughout our history, nothing prepared us for the sustained 
radicalism of the Warren Court, its wholesale subordination of 
law to an egalitarian politics that, by deforming both the 
                                                        
39 For excellent, succinct summaries covering the history of originalism, see 
Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 
611–29 (1999); Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the 
False Promise of Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 530–33 (2008); Keith 
E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599-603 
(2004); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 
49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989). 
40  Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. at 1188; see also 
Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L. J. 239, 247 
(2009) (explaining that the “sweeping decisions of the Warren Court” led 
conservatives to insist that “the Constitution be interpreted to give effect to the 
intent of the framers”); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political 
Practice: The Right's Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 550-54 
(2006) (describing modern conservative jurisprudential thought as a response to 
the judicial activism of the liberal Warren Court).  John Hart Ely makes the 
more precise claim that the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade forced 
constitutional law professors to decide where they stood in relation to the 
division between originalists and non-originalists.  DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, 
at 2-3. 
41  See, e.g. Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1 (1971) (reflecting on the implications of Wechsler’s 
concept of neutral principles and applying that concept to some First 
Amendment issues). 
42 See id. at 4-6 (criticizing Judge Wright and the claim that the Supreme Court 
must unavoidably make fundamental value choices in interpreting the 
Constitution).  
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Constitution and statutes, reordered our politics and our 
society.43 
 
Given the focus of early originalism on the Supreme Court’s 
perceived liberal, judicial activism, originalism had a clear, if 
purely negative, political agenda, and it assumed that its agenda 
could be realized if judges respected the wills of legislatures. 44 
Early academic practitioners of originalism described their 
project as one of fidelity to the original intentions of the Framers.45  
Although contemporary academic and judicial originalists 
sometimes lapse into the language of intentions, 46 originalism 
largely abandoned the intentionalist project in the 1980s, when 
legal scholars published compelling criticisms of the original 
intentions approach.47  Stanford Law School’s Paul Brest exposed 
                                                        
43 Robert Bork, Introduction, in A COUNTRY, at ix, ix-x. 
44  Dennis Goldford provides a nuaned reading of the relationship between 
political conservatism and originalism.  He concedes that originalism was a 
conservative reaction to the perceived liberalism of the Warren and Burger 
Courts but rejects the notion that originalism and the principle of judicial 
restraint could be tied to any particular political ideology.  DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 20-54 
(2005). Raoul Berger, one of the leading academic originalisms of the 1960s and 
70s, was a principled originalist who abhorred judicial activism, but he did not 
have a political axe to grind.  He may well have agreed with the politics of the 
Warren and Burger Courts but he opposed government by judiciary.  For an 
appreciation of Berger’s work and of his enduring influence, see Jonathan G. 
O’Neill, Raoul Berger and the Restoration of Originalism, 96 NORTHWESTERN 
L. REV. 253 (2001). 
45  See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 364 (1977) (contending 
that any jurisprudence not bound by original intent amounts to judicial re-
writing of the Constitution); Edwin Meese, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original 
Intent, 11 HARV. J. L & PUB. POL’Y 5 (1988) (; Robert H. Bork, The 
Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 
823 (1986) (“original intent is the only legitimate basis for constitutional 
decisionmaking.”). 
46 See Clarence Thomas, How to Read the Constitution, excerpt from the 2008 
Wriston Lecture delivered to the Manhanttan Institute, in THE WALL ST. J. (Oct. 
20, 2008), at A19 (“[T]here are really only two ways to interpret the 
Constitution – try to discern as best we can what the framers intended or make it 
up.”).  
47 See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 
611, 611-12 (1999) (describing the original intentions approach as having been 
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the extraordinary difficulty in reconstructing the Framers’ original 
intentions with respect to any particular constitutional provision,48 
a very strong position, given the state of historical research at the 
time. Brest’s critique established the foundations for the 
“instability thesis,” that is, the idea that the contestations that 
emerge from the historical record render futile originalism’s 
attempts to fix constitutional meaning.49  
It is very difficult to know the intentions of the Framers, 
beyond what we can discern from the text itself, based on the 
legislative history of the Constitution. The complex ratification 
process involved hundreds of actors, and records of the ratification 
process are spotty at best. 50   However, some contemporary 
originalists are increasingly confident of our ability to discern the 
                                                                                                                            
“trounced” by its critics); id. at 613 (“If ever a theory had a stake driven through 
its heart, it seems to be originalism.”). 
48 See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 
B.U. L. REV. 204, 222 (1980) (concluding that an “interpreter’s understanding of 
the original understanding may be so indeterminate as to undermine the 
rationale for originalism” in the case of many controversial constitutional 
provisions). 
49  See, e.g., DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE 
DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 146-49 (2005) (discussing both empirical and 
theoretical difficulties with the attempt to reconstruct the intention of the 
Framers); Patrick J. Charles, History in Law, Mythmaking, and Constitutional 
Legitimacy, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23, 26-27 (2014) (describing historians as 
having exposed original intents originalism as an instance of the pathetic fallacy 
and pointing out that the move to textualism does little to prevent subjective 
outcomes); Joel Alicea & Donald L. Drakeman, The Limits of the New 
Originalism, 15 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1170-82  (2013) (using the early 
case of United States v. Hylton to demonstrate the varied understandings among 
the Framers of the meaning of “excise tax”). 
50 See PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION 
1787-1788  122-23 (2010) (describing the journal of the New Jersey ratifying 
convention as not “very revealing” and noting that “[t]here were no published 
debates or newspaper accounts of the New Jersey convention”); id. at 124 
(observing that Georgia unanimously ratified the Constitution after one day of 
deliberations and that the journal of those deliberations records only the result 
with no explanation); id. at 457 (obvserving that “[n]o record survives of the 
debates at Fayetteville, . . . ” where North Carolina held its ratifying 
convention).  Delaware approved the Constitution unanimously after a four-day 
convention.  Id. at 122.  Records are so spotty that Pauline Maier mentions 
Delaware on only eight pages in her 500-page history of ratification, and she 
recounts the ratification on only one of those pages.  Id. 
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original understanding of the Constitution through the use of 
computer-assisted research techniques.51 
Duke Law’s H. Jefferson Powell emphasized the framers’ 
reluctance to have interpretations of the Constitution depend on 
claimed knowledge of their own original intentions.52  Anticipating 
contemporary textualism, Powell argued that in the early Republic, 
references to “intention” were akin to the common law tradition 
whereby one discerns the intention of a legal text from the text 
itself. 53  Joseph Ellis concludes that the Constitution does not 
embody “timeless truths” and that the Framers’ humility, in 
knowing that they did not have all the answers, has enabled their 
Constitution to survive. 54   They aimed instead to “provide a 
political platform wide enough to allow for considerable latitude 
within which future generations could make their own 
decisions.”55  According to Ellis, Jefferson spoke for of the most 
prominent Framers when he urged that constitutions ought not be 
                                                        
51  See Lee Strang, Blunting the Instability Critique: Original Meaning 
Originalism and 
Computer-Assisted Research Techniques, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2665131 (arguing that 
computer-assisted research techniques enables originalism to overcome the 
instability thesis); Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of 
the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847 (2003) (reviewing all instances of 
the word “commerce” in the Pennsylvania Gazette from 1720-1800 and finding 
that the word’s conventional meaning is relatively narrow, connoting only 
“trade” or “exchange”); but see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of Interpreting 
the Commerce Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1185, 1199-
1200 (2003) (noting a broader understanding of the term “commerce” in 
writings, such as those of Adam Smith and Daniel Defoe with which the 
Framers were familiar and that some Framers express broader understandings of 
“commerce” at the Convention itself).   
52 See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 885, 906-07 (1985) (pointing out the Federalists’ view that the 
intentions of the drafters of the Constitution would not be legally relevant 
because they were “mere scriveners” appointed to draft an instrument for the 
people). 
53  See id. at 895-902 (describing the evolution of the objective apporach to 
common law interpretation in which one gave effect to the will of the parties to 
a contract or the drafters of the statute through interpretation of the text intended 
to give expression of those wills) 
54  JOSEPH J. ELLIS, THE QUARTET: ORCHESTRATING THE SECOND AMERICAN 
REVOLUSION, 1781-1789 218 (2015) [hereinafer ELLIS, THE QUARTET]. 
55 Id. at 219. 
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regarded with “sanctimonious reverence” and that law and 
institutions must develop “hand in hand with the progress of the 
human mind.”56 Statements by the drafters as to their intentions 
formed no part of 18th- or early 19th-century attempts to discern the 
Constitution’s meaning.57 
In response to critiques of intentionalism, originalists refined 
their methodology and shifted their focus from the original 
intentions of the Constitution’s drafters to the understandings of 
the men who ratified it, as a shorthand for the original public 
understanding of the constitution’s text.58  This made more sense, 
because we are less interested in what the Framers thought they 
were saying at the constitutional convention in Philadelphia than 
we are with what those who voted for ratification in the thirteen 
separate ratification processes thought they were agreeing to. 59  
From there, the shift to textualist originalism was not far.  Justice 
Scalia is largely credited with spearheading the shift in the 
originalist movement from intentionalism to textualism – that is, 
the shift from a focus on the intent of the drafters or ratifiers of the 
Constitution to a focus on the original public meaning of the 
document as it would have been understood by educated people 
living in the late 18th century.60  We care about that understanding 
                                                        
56  See id. at 219-20 (quoting a letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel 
Kercheval, wirtten July 12, 1816 and conveniently available in The Portable 
Thomas Jefferson 558-59 (Merrill D. Peterson, ed., 1975). 
57 See Powell, 98 HARV. L. REV.  at 888 (“This original ‘original intent’ was 
determined not by historical inquiry into the expectations of the individuals 
involved in framing and ratifying the Constitution . . .”). 
58  See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144 (1990) (clarifying that the search for the original 
meaning is not the search for the drafters subjective intention but for “what the 
public of that time would have understood the words to mean”). 
59  See Powell, 98 HARV. L. REV. at 888 (“To the extent that constitutional 
interpreters considered historical evidence to have any interpretive value, what 
they deemed relevant was evidence of the proceedings of the state ratifying 
conventions, not of the intent of the framers.”); Charles Lofgren, The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 77, 79 (1988) 
(contending that the Framers “were clearly hospitable to the use of original 
intent in the sense of ratifier intent, which is the original intent in a 
constitutional sense”). 
60  See Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of ”Faint-Hearted” 
Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 9 (2006) (“Justice Scalia was perhaps the first 
defender of originalism to shift the theory from its previous focus on the 
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because the ratification process was a founding moment, at which 
the states through their representatives (eventually) all agreed to 
bind their wills through a common text. 61  So what judges ought to 
be trying to reconstruct is not what the drafters thought they said 
but what a reasonable, educated person would have understood the 
constitutional text to mean. 
We have now come full circle, with a group of originalist 
scholars embracing the intentionalist label in full awareness of the 
debate over its adequacy. 62   In fact, the difference between 
textualist approaches or original-public-meaning approaches and 
intentionalist originalism should not be overstated.  Regardless of 
nomenclature, originalists of all stripes consult the same sources in 
determining the meaning of the text. 63   The Framers whose 
                                                                                                                            
intentions of the framers of the Constitution to the original public meaning of 
the text at the time of its enactment.”); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and 
Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 554-55 (2003) (crediting 
Justice Scalia with the suggestion, accepted by most originalists, to change the 
label of the doctrine from original intent to original meaning). 
61 See Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 411, 417-18 (2013) (articulating new originalism’s normative claim that 
original meaning should presumptively govern constitutional interpretation). 
62  See e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL 
REASONING 131-232 (2008) (elaborated a theory of interpretation whose goal is 
to capture the lawmaker’s intended meaning). Others, while not embracing 
intentionalism, have pointed out that the new originalism fares not better in its 
attempts to escape the subjectivism associated with non-originalist mechanisms 
of constitutional interpretation; Heidi M. Hurd, Why Would Anyone Care About 
Original Intent? available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2612115 at 4-5 (contending 
that if Alexander and Sherwin’s defense of intentionalism fails, other versions of 
originalism are unlikely to be more persuasive); Joel Alicea & Donald L. 
Drakeman, The Limits of the New Originalism, 15 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 1161, 
1208-09 (2013) (advocating a “descriptivist” version of intentionalism and 
permitting courts to allow the Framers’ intention to break “ties” when original 
public meaning is unclear ); Tara Smith, Originalism’s Misplaced Fidelity: 
“Original” Meaning Is Not Objective, 26 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 1, 
55-56 (2009) (concluding that both original public understanding approaches 
and Randy Barnett’s attempt to ground origianlism in the importance of the 
“writtenness” of the constitution fail to escape subjectivism).   
63 See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. 
L.J. 713, 741-42 (2011) (noting that even so-called New Originalists concede 
that recourse to evidence of original intent or original expected applications is 
the best method for establishing original public meaning); Richard S. Kay, 
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intentions shaped the text were among the most prolific writers 
who opined on the text’s meaning and thus provided evidence of 
the Constitution’s original public meaning.  They also often 
numbered among the ratifiers, whose understanding of the text 
matters the most.64 
In this context, it is worth noting that the leading historians of 
the founding period, including Gordon Wood and Jack Rakove, are 
not originalists. 65   Joseph J. Ellis, a Pulitzer Prize-winning  
historian who has written nine books about the founding era, 
decries the pointlessness of trying to imagine what George 
Washington’s view might be of contemporary constitutional 
                                                                                                                            
Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 
NW. L. REV. 703,  712-13 (2009) (concluding that the public meaning of the 
constitutional text almost always follows the intentions of those who drafted and 
adopted it). 
64  See, e.g., SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS 79 n.1 (2007) (“The distinction 
between intention and meaning is a refinement that cuts no ice with us.”); Henry 
P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 375 n.130 
(1981) (“[T]he difficulties of ascertaining the intent of the ratifiers leaves little 
choice but to accept the intent of the Framers as a fair reflection of it.”); Caleb 
Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 557 
(2003) (pointing out that original intent and original meaning most likely align 
in most cases and where they do not, modern readers are not well positioned to 
discern original meaning). 
65  See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 6 (1996) (calling the idea that the Constitution 
had a fixed meaning at the time it was adopted “a mirage”); Gordon S. Wood, 
The Supreme Court and the Uses of History, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 435, 443-44 
(2013) (distinguishing real history from “law office history” or “history lite” and 
arguing that no historian who wants to maintain her reputation among her peers 
should engage in the latter); Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the 
Constitution, or, the Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 575, 578-79 (2011)(“Historical answers may be just as indeterminate as 
other forms of legal reasoning, allowing judges to pick and choose the evidence 
that satisfies their predispositions.”); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, 
Essay, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy Relationship, 18 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 155, 165 (2006) (noting that most academics with degrees in both law 
and history are “highly skeptical” of originalism because they tend to have more 
nuanced views of history events); Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the 
Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 
349, 351-58 (1989) (marshaling evidence that the Framers did not intend for the 
Constitution to be interpreted according to their intentions and raising questions 
about who should be included among “the Framers”). 
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controversies. He compares the exercise to “planting cut 
flowers.”66  Ellis concludes his most recent book by noting that the 
one original intention that the Framers all shared “was opposition 
to any judicial doctrine of ‘original intent.’” The Framers wished 
to be remembered, Ellis concedes, “but they did not wish to be 
embalmed.”67   
C. The Return of Originalist Judicial 
Activism 
There is a second development in originalist theory that is at least 
as significant as the move from intentionalism to 
textualism.  Originalism began in the 1960s as a theory of judicial 
humility.  As Thomas Colby put it, “Originalism was born of a 
desire to constrain judges. Judicial constraint was its heart and 
soul—its raison d’être.”68  It was a response to what was at the 
time regarded as a period of unprecedented judicial 
activism.  Today, originalism thrives as a far more robust, 
sophisticated and self-confident theory that contemporary judges 
may overrule legislative enactments and court precedents based on 
originalist methods, which may be intentionalist or textualist, as 
the occasion dictates.69  Originalism now enacts judicial activism 
rather than resisting it.70 
Just to take a few examples: the Supreme Court recently 
recognized for the first time that the Second Amendment protects 
                                                        
66 ELLIS, THE QUARTET, at xvii. 
67 Id. at 220. 
68 Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. at 714. 
69 See Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 411, 420-32 (2013) (arguing that, even where recent Supreme Court 
cases were decided on other grounds, originalism still exerts a “gravitational 
force” influencing those opinions). 
70 See, e.g., Eric J Segall, The Constitution According to Justices Scalia and 
Thomas: Alive and Kickin’” 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1663 (2014) (discussing 
recent constitutional decisions in which Justices Scalia and Thomas have voted 
to overturn precedent or struck down legislation); Colby, The Sacrifice of the 
New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. at 714-15 (noting that the “new originalism” has 
abandoned the emphasis on judicial constraint that inspired its original 
popularity); Geoffrey Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Future of 
Constitutional Law, 82 TULANE L. REV. 1533, 1548 (2008) (noting that 
originalism can be passivist or activist and criticizing the Roberts Court for 
ignoring precedent). 
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an individual right to bear arms and struck down state 71  and 
federal 72  gun control enactments that had been in place for 
decades. 73   In so doing, the Court overturned 70-year-old 
constitutional precedent (a McReynolds opinion, no less) that had 
specifically rejected the claim that the Second Amendment 
protected an individual right to bear arms outside the context of a 
well-regulated militia,74 and which had been subsequently relied 
on in hundreds of cases.75   
In its first Obamacare decision, 76  the Supreme Court was 
willing to draw on originalist jurisprudence77 and set aside decades 
of precedent during which the scope of Congress’s powers under 
                                                        
71 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010)  
72 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008)  
73 See McDonald, 130 S.Ct at 3026 (noting that Chicago’s ordinance that was 
challenged in the case dated from 1982); Heller 128 S.Ct. at 2854 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the original version of the challenged legislation, which 
was passed in 1976). 
74  See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174. 178 (“In the absence of any 
evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of 
less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship 
to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that 
the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an 
instrument.”). 
75 See Heller 128 U.S. at 2823 * n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing cases and 
noting that until a Fifth Circuit decision in 2001, every Circuit Court had 
followed Miller in holding that the Second Amendment does not protect an 
individual right to possess and use weapons for private purposes).  
76 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sibelius, 132 S.Ct.  2566 
(2012). 
77  See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE TOUGH LUCK CONSTITUTION AND THE 
ASSAULT ON HEALTH CARE REFORM 114 (2013) (specifying Chief Justice 
Roberts’ unacknowledged reliance on Gary Lawson and David Kopels’ narrow 
reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause based on historical evidence from 
the eighteenth century); id. at 118 (characterizing the opinion of the dissenting 
Justices who joined in Justice Scalia’s opinion as adopting an interpretation of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause that Justice Marshall specifically rejected in 
McCulloch v. Maryland); Randy Barnett, A weird victory for federalism, 
SCOTUSblog (June 28, 2012), available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/a-weird-victory-for-federalism/ 
(proclaiming that the Court had “accepted all of our arguments” in adopting  the 
novel action/inaction distinction in NFIB v. Sibelius). 
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the Commerce Clause was nearly unfettered.78   The Court first 
began its retreat from deference in 1995 with United States v. 
Lopez,79 but in all but one of the cases in which the Court struck 
down laws as exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, it 
did so by a 5-4 votes with the Court’s five most conservative 
Justices in the majority.  In so doing the Justices “most commonly 
associated with advocating judicial restraint . . . abandoned almost 
60 years of deference to the legislature under the commerce 
clause.”80   
Finally, in Citizens United,81 the Court ordered rehearing and 
decided issues that were not raised in the first oral argument before 
it in the case.82  It then overturned recent precedent and invalidated 
long-standing campaign finance regulation. 83   All of these 
decisions might be on solid ground and well reasoned, but they are 
not the actions of a minimalist court.  As a result, some originalists 
see in its moment of triumph, especially in the context of the 
Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence, the seeds of 
corruption.84  
III. Originalism as Inescapable and Doomed 
It is now very difficult to imagine or to defend a theory of 
constitutional interpretation that would be indifferent to the 
original meaning of the text.  Thus some proponents of originalism 
                                                        
78 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
262-71 (5th ed. 2015) (discussing the Court’s extremely broad understanding of 
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers between 1937 and 1995). 
79 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
80 CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 281. 
81 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).  
82 See Jeffrey Toobin, Annals of Law, Money Unlimited: How Chief Justice John 
Roberts orchestrated the Citizens United decision, THE NEW YORKER (May 21, 
2012), available at  http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/05/21/money-
unlimited. 
83 See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct at 886 (2010) (holding that the doctrine of stare 
decisis does not compel adherence to Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
(1990) or McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003)). 
84 See J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Of Guns, Abortions and the Unraveling Rule of 
Law, 95 VIRG. L. REV. 253 (2009) (likening the activism informing the Heller 
decision to that of Roe v. Wade). 
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have confidently declared that we are all originalists now.85  And 
both originalism and originalists have made great advances.  
Originalism has largely addressed the concerns of its early critics, 
and as a result it has become a far more robust interpretive 
approach.  As more and more legal scholars engage in originalist 
research, the amount of information we have about the background 
to the Constitution steadily grows.  This historical research into 
original intent and original meaning in turn informs judicial 
opinions and scholarship, effecting a fundamental reorientation of 
the interpretive task.  
The last few decades have produced an incredible outpouring 
of high-quality legal-historical scholarship.  As a result, originalists 
can now claim much greater and more specific knowledge of the 
original meaning of, sampling just some of the recent scholarship: 
the Commerce Clause; 86  the Necessary and Proper Clause; 87 
foreign affairs; 88  the scope of Executive power; 89  Article IV’s 
Privileges and Immunities Clause; 90  the Supremacy Clause; 91 
                                                        
85  ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1 (2011). 
86 Mark R. Killenbeck, The Original(?), Public(?) Meaning of “Commerce”, 16 
J. CONST. L. 289 (2013); Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin’s Interaction Theory of 
“Commerce”, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 623; Randy E. Barnett, The Original 
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001) 
87 GARY LAWSON, ET AL., THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 
(2010); John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L. J. 1045 
(2014); John T. Valauri, Originalism and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 39 
O.N.U. L. REV. 773 (2013); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183 (2003). 
88  MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
(2007).  Ingrid Wuerth, An Originalism for Foreign Affairs? 53 ST. LOUIS U. L. 
J. 5 (2008). 
89 ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER 
THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010); David Fontana, The Second American 
Revolution in the Separation of Powers, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1409 (2009); Robert G. 
Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Constitution’s “Executive Vesting 
Clause”—Evidence from Eighteenth-Century Drafting Practice, 31 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 1 (2009). 
90 Stewart Jay, Origins of the Privileges and Immunities of State Citizenship 
under Article IV, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 1 (2013); Robert G. Natelson, The 
Original Meaning of the Privilges and Immunities Clause, 43 GA. L. REV. 1117 
(2009); Kenyon D. Bunch, The Original Understanding of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause: Michael Perry's Justification For Judicial Activism Or 
Robert Bork’s Constitutional Inkblot? 10 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 321 (2000). 
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foreign affairs;92 the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause;93 the 
First Amendment’s religion clauses;94 the Second Amendment;95 
the Fourth Amendment;96 the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ 
                                                                                                                            
91 Michael D. Ramsey, The Supremacy Clause, Original Meaning, and Modern 
Law, 74 OH. ST. L. J. 559 (2013); Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause 
Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731 (2010); D. A. Jeremy Telman, Medellín 
and Originalism, 68 MD. L. REV. 377 (2009); Martin S. Flaherty, History 
Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as 
“Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999); John C. Yoo, 
Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original 
Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The 
Four Doctrines of Self Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695 (1995). 
92  MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
(2007).  Ingrid Wuerth, An Originalism for Foreign Affairs? 53 ST. LOUIS U. L. 
J. 5 (2008). 
93  Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable 
Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L. J. 1 (2011); Eugene 
Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of the First 
Amendment, 97 GEO. L. J. 1057 (2009); 
94  Carl H. Esbeck, Uses and Abuses of Textualism and Originalism in 
Establishment Clause Interpretation, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 489; Andrew 
Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 727 (2009); Vincent Philip Munoz, The Original Meaning of the Free 
Exercise Clause: The Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1083 (2008); Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the 
Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346 (2002); Michael W. McConnell, 
The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of  Religion, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1416 (1990). 
95 Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 
56 UCLA L. REV. 1343 (2009); David Thomas Konig, Why the Second 
Amendment Has a Preamble: Original Public Meaning and the Political Culture 
of Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295 
(2009); Nathan Kozuskanich, Originalism, History and the Second Amendment: 
What Did Bearing Arms Really Mean to the Founders? 10 J. CONST. L. 413 
(2008); Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early 
American Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487 (2004); Saul 
Cornell, Commonplace Or Anachronism: The Standard Model, the Second 
Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional 
Theory, 16 CONST. COMM. 221 (1999). 
96 Fabio Arcilo, Jr., A Response to Professor Steinberg’s Fourth Amendment 
Chutzpah, 10 U. PA. J. CONST L. 1229 (2008); David E. Steinberg, The Uses and 
Misuses of Fourth Amendment History, 10 U. PA. J. CONST L. 581 (2008); Akhil 
Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment, First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 
(1994); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (2000). 
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Due Process Clauses; 97  the Eight Amendment; 98  the Ninth 
Amendment; 99  the Tenth Amendment; 100  the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause; 101  and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause. 102  Judges who 
want to give originalist interpretations to specific constitutional 
clauses can now draw on this extremely rich trove of research in 
order to do so. 
                                                        
97  Natalie M. Banta, Substantive Due Process in Exile: The Supreme 
Court’s Original Interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 13 WYO. L. REV. 151 (2013); Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only 
Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408 (2010); Lawrence 
Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? On 
Originalism, Due Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking Tickets, 60 
OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2007); Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due Process: the 
Original Understanding, 4 CONST. COMM. 339 (1987). 
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(2008). 
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Lockean Legal Theory Assist in Interpretation? 5 NYU J. L. & LIB. 1(2010); 
Michael W. McConnell, The Ninth Amendment in Light of Text and History, 
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Amendment, 56 Drake L. Rev. 875 (2008). 
100 Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth Amendment, 
Popular Sovereignty and “Expressly” Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1889 (2008); Gary Lawson, A Truism with Attitude: The Tenth Amendment 
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NOTRE DAME L. REV. 71 (2013); Chistropher R. Green, The Original Sense of 
the (Equal) Protection Clause: Subsequent Interpretation and Application, 19 
GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 219 (2009); Christopher R. Green, The Original 
Sense Of The (Equal) Protection Clause: Pre-Enactment History, 19 GEO. 
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1 (2008); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the 
Desegregation Decisions, 81 VIRG. L. REV. 947 (1995). 
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1275 (2013); Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
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Nonetheless, our attempts to discern the original meaning have 
not produced greater certainty or predictability in constitutional 
interpretation, which is still claimed as one of the advantages of the 
originalist approach.103  In Heller, the majority and the dissent used 
nearly identical interpretive methods to arrive at opposite 
conclusions regarding the meaning of the Second Amendment.104  
Self-proclaimed originalists are divided on every conceivable 
issue,105 as is clear from the number of times that Justice Thomas 
has written separately from Justice Scalia often only to arrive at the 
same conclusion by a separate originalist path.106   
                                                        
103 See, e.g. Richard S. Kay, Adherence to Original Intentions in Constitutional 
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. L. REV. 226, 286-87 
(1988) (defending originalism as “about as stable and objective as human beings 
can contrive while still working with a constitution sufficiently complex to be a 
workable instrument of government”); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for 
Non-Originalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 641 (1999) (linking the legitimacy of a 
written constitution to the fact that its provisions will be respected over time). 
104 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008). 
105 See, e.g. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial 
Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the 
Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1282 (1997) (finding historical 
support for a range of views on the original understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause). Compare Frederick Mark Gedicks, An 
Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law 
Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 668–70 (2009) 
(defending substantive due process as consistent with public meaning 
originalism) with John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional 
Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 542–55 (1997) (questioning the propriety of 
substantive due process based on an examination of the historical record).  
Compare ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 39, 166 (1990) (declaring the meaning the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause largely unknown and unascertainable) with Steven G. 
Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 663, 694-95 (2009) (finding that the Privileges or Immunities 
clause has a clear, specific meaning).  
106 See, e.g. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sibelius, 132 S.Ct. 
2566, 2677 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (adhering to the view that “the very 
notion of a ‘substantial effects’ test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent 
with the original understanding of Congress' powers and with this Court’s early 
Commerce Clause cases.”); Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2235 (2005) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (calling the “substantial effects” doctrine rootless because 
tethered to neither the Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and Proper Clause); 
United States v. Morrison, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 1759 (2000) (Thomas,J., concurring) 
(writing separately to opine that precedents establishing Congress’s power to 
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One critic of originalism has identified 72 different theoretical 
strains within the originalist camp.107  That camp has become so 
broad as to encompass the very people whom some originalists 
identify as their arch-nemeses.108  And in some cases, originalists 
add so many caveats to their insistence on originalism that they 
end up sounding a lot like living constitutionalists.109  Moreover, 
because of the adversarial nature of the common law, as Richard 
Primus has pointed out, the more people become adept at 
originalist arguments, the less helpful originalist arguments 
become in adjudication.110  
                                                                                                                            
regulate economic activities that substantially affect interstate commerce should be 
overturned)  Lopez v, United States, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1642-43 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (same);. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 
879 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting) (writing separately to insist 
that the Constitution protects anonymous political speech); McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3058 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (rejecting the 
majority’s substantive due process reasoning and finding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause protects an individual right to 
bear arms against state interference). See also Timothy Sandefur, Clarence 
Thomas’s Jurisprudence Unexplained, 4 NYU J. L. & LIBERTY 535, 553 (2009) 
(questioning why Justices Thomas and Scalia, both regarded as originalists, so 
often differ on constitutional issues).  
107  Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009).  
Berman does not number them.  The tally is provided in James E. Fleming, The 
Balkinization of Originalism, 2012 U. ILL L. REV. 669, 671; see also id. at 670 
(contending that the only thing the various originalisms have in common is their 
rejection of moral readings of the Constitution).  Seee also Thomas B. Colby, 
The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEORGETOWN L. J. 713, 716-36 (2011) 
(discussing various strains within originalism, including original intent, original 
meaning, subjective and objective meaning, actual and hypothetical 
understanding, standards and general principles, differing levels of generality, 
original expected application, original principles, interpretation, construction, 
normative and semantic originalism). 
108 See Keith E. Whittington, Dworkin’s “Originalism”: The Role of Intentions 
in Constitutional Interpretation, 62 REV. POL. 197, 201 (2000) (construing 
Ronald Dworkin’s approach as a commitment to the “abstract principles” that 
the Founders wrote into the Constitution). 
109 See James E. Fleming, Are We All Origianlists Now? I Hope Not! 91 TEX L. 
REV. 1785, 1796 (2013) (providing a quotation from Robert Bork in which he 
incorporates positions that one more readily associates with Ronald Dworkin or 
Jack Balkin). 
110 Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 165, 207 (2008). 
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There are some constitutional provisions with respect to which 
we are all originalists.  When it comes to the rule that the President 
“shall have attained to the age of thirty-five Years,”111  nobody 
argues that this should be read to mean anything other than what it 
meant to the Framers. There have been no serious attempts to 
argue that, for example, because the Constitution is a living 
document, and because life expectancy in the 18th century was 
about 37 years, only people on death’s door should be eligible for 
our nation’s highest office.112   Similarly, when the Constitution 
speaks of “domestic violence,” 113  we all understand that the 
reference is to civil unrest and not to spousal abuse.114  In such 
contexts, if we want to be taken seriously, we are all originalists. 
In other contexts, however, nobody can claim that all 
constitutional difficulties can be resolved through originalist 
interpretive methods, because some of our most fundamental 
constitutional traditions have no textual basis.  Thus the so-called 
“new originalism” distinguishes between constitutional 
interpretation and constitutional construction. 
Constructions do not pursue a preexisting if deeply hidden 
meaning in the founding document; rather, they elucidate the text 
in the interstices of discoverable, interpretive meaning, where the 
text is so broad or so underdetermined as to be incapable of 
faithful but exhaustive reduction to legal rules.115 
 
Keith Whittington has identified scores of fundamental institutions 
that are integral to our actual, lived constitution but about which 
                                                        
111 U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1, ¶ 5. 
112 See Andrew B. Coan, Talking Originalism, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 847, 850-51 
(listing “precise” constitutional provisions about which there is no controversy, 
including “the presidential age requirement, equal state representation in the 
Senate, proportional representation in the House of Representatives, and the 
procedures for appointing and confirming federal judges”). 
113 U.S. Const., Art IV § 4. 
114 See Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of New Originalism, 99 GEORGETOWN 
L. J. 713, 753 (2011), but see Mark S. Stein, The Domestic Violence Clause in 
“New Originalist” Theory, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 129, 133–35 (2009) 
(arguing that a new originalist reading of the clause could permit such an 
understanding of “domestic violence”). 
115  See KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED 
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 5 (1999) 
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the Constitution itself is silent.  These include what Whittington 
calls “organic structures,” such as the various agencies of the 
administrative state, the nine-Justice Supreme Court, the creation 
of inferior courts and the President’s cabinet. 116  They also include 
structures of political participation and citizenship structures, such 
as the party system and voting processes.117  Here, interestingly 
enough, Whittington includes the regulation of campaign 
finance, 118  which the Supreme Court has treated as an issue of 
interpretation rather than construction.119  Whittington includes as 
constitutional constructions principles of delegation and 
distribution of federal powers, such as executive and 
congressional/executive agreements and judicial review of 
legislative enactments.120 He also includes economic infrastructural 
elements, such as the federal reserve and the federal treasury,121 to 
which we might add federal bankruptcy courts and the national 
highway system. 122  Nobody can seriously claim that the 
constitutional text can determine whether all of these things should 
or should not be part of our constitutional system.123 
In addition to the Constitution’s silences, there are also 
numerous key constitutional words and phrases that defy clear 
definition.  These include, to name some of the Constitution’s 
“majestic generalities”: 124  “due process of law,” 125  “equal 
protection of the laws,”126 “cruel and unusual punishment,”127 and 
“necessary and proper.” 128  As Randy Barnett, one of the most 
                                                        
116 Id. at 9-10, 12. 
117 Id. at 10. 
118 Id. at 12. 
119 Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). 
120 WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, at 12. 
121 Id. 
122 See id. at 11 (noting that his list of constitutional constructions only scratches 
the surface but is intended to indicate their nature and range). 
123 See Jack Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 549, 604-05 (2009) (“[O]riginalism does not dictate the results 
of constitutional construction, and for a very large number of disputed cases, 
construction is the name of the game.”) 
124 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). 
125 U.S. Const., am. V, XIV, § 1. 
126 U.S. Const., am. XIV, § 1. 
127 U.S. Const., am. VIII. 
128 U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, ¶ 18. See Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New 
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persuasive originalists, concedes, there are times when we are 
unable to discern what the constitutional meaning is, or as he puts 
it, there are times when “constitutional meaning runs out.”129  To 
some extent the difference between originalists and non-
originalists are differences with regard to the frequency with which 
original meaning runs out.   
As a result, the difference between originalists and non-
originalists is not that originalists think the constitutional text is 
controlling and that non-originalists think that the constitutional 
text is irrelevant.  In almost all cases, contemporary judges faced 
with a constitutional issue now start with an attempt to discern the 
original meaning, and if the original meaning can be discerned, it 
is controlling absent some strong reason to abandon it.130   Justice 
Scalia has acknowledged that the differences between his own 
originalism and moderate non-originalism are small and that most 
non-originalists are moderate.131  As we shall see, although several 
Justices have proclaimed themselves as adherents of originalism, 
Justice Thomas is the only one who writes opinions in which he 
arrives at a conclusion as to the Constitution’s original meaning 
                                                                                                                            
Originalism, 99 GEORGETOWN L. J. 713,  
129 See Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 65, 69 (2011) (acknowledging that the meaning of the constitution 
sometimes runs out and acknowledging that “[o]riginalism is not a theory of 
what to do when original meaning runs out”); see also Lawrence B. Solum, 
Semantic Originalism 19 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law Ill. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, No. 07-24, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id_1120244 (observing that 
when the meaning of the constitutional text is underdetermined, original 
meaning “runs out” and must be supplemented with constitutional 
construction);. 
130 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty (The Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values) 8 (2004), available at http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-
z/b/Breyer_2006.pdf (contrasting his approach to interpretation, which places 
greater emphasis on consequences to other approaches that place greater weight 
on language, history and tradition); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the 
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 229 (1980) (observing that text 
and original understanding are important for the non-originalist but not 
determinative). 
131 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 
(1989). 
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and then ends the analysis.132 But as Scott Gerber noted early on, 
even Justice Thomas’s originalism is also not entirely consistent.133 
IV. Two Originalist Approaches: Scalia and 
Thomas 
It is now time to look more closely at the methodologies of the 
Supreme Court’s self-proclaimed originalist Justices.  The two 
men could not be more different in their temperaments.  The 
combative Justice Scalia has transformed oral arguments with his 
frequent questions134 and made “vitriol” a featured component of 
the Supreme Court Justices’ dissents.135   Justice Thomas is the 
quietest Justice.136 In 2013, Justice Thomas spoke from the bench 
for the first time in seven years, but even then his comment was 
not a question relating to the case but a joke at the expense of Yale 
                                                        
132  See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith, Rights Behind Bars: The Distinctive 
Viewpoint of Justice Clarence Thomas, 88 UNIV. DETROIT MERCY L. REV. 829-
30 (2011) (citing approvingly Linda Greenhouse’s observation that Justice 
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Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. 
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Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia and the Future of Originalism, 88 U. DET. 
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Analysis of Supreme Court Justices’ Behavior during Oral Arguments, 55 LOY. 
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each of his colleagues”). 
135  A Westlaw search (Scalia /s dissent /s vitriol!) turned up 34 results, 
accounting for nearly one-third of all results in with the words “vitriol” and 
dissent appeared in the same sentence.  The latter search captured dissents from 
beyond the realm of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
136  See J. Richard Broughton, The Loudness of Justice Thomas, 88 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 737, 738 (2011) (contrasting Justice Thomas’s silence during 
oral argument with the impact of his written opinions) 
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Law School.137  However, like Justice Black, he is not afraid to 
write separately to stand up for his principled version of 
originalism in constitutional interpretation. 
A. Justice Scalia: Originalism “Done Badly” 
In his most extended essay on originalism,138  Justice Scalia 
recognized that the originalist enterprise really requires training in 
historical research, a task for which most judges are ill prepared.139  
Even a professional historian, Justice Scalia concedes, would need 
more time to undertake the originalist task properly than a judge 
typically has to decide a case.140  Still, Justice Scalia wrote that 
originalism is the best approach because any other approach would 
involve judges deciding cases by their own lights rather than by the 
lights of those who agreed to be bound by the Constitution’s 
provisions.141 Even if determining the meaning of those provisions 
is difficult for a judge, Justice Scalia concluded that a “thing worth 
doing is worth doing badly.”142  
Justice Scalia mentions that the statement comes from G.K. 
Chesterton, but he does not mention that it comes from 
Chesterton’s 1910 book, What’s Wrong with the World.143  Justice 
Scalia would likely find much to admire in the book.  To the extent 
that Chesterton highlights a lot of things that are wrong with the 
                                                        
137 See Mike Sacks, Justice Clarence Thomas Speaks After Almost 7 Years Of 
Silence, HUFF POST (Jan. 14, 2013) (noting that Justice Thomas is well known as 
a “smiling, jovial presence” and thus finding his outburst of wit unsurprising); 
Jeffrey Toobin, Clarence Thomas Speaks, Finally, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 14, 
2013), available at http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/clarence-
thomas-speaks-finally (characterizing the joke at Yale’s expense as evidencing 
the Justice’s still-simmering bitterness and resentment over his treatment at 
Yale) 
138 Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
139  See id. at 860-61 (conceding that the Supreme Court is not the ideal 
environment in which to undertake the sorts of historical research necessary to 
origalist jurisprudence, nor does it have the apropriate personnel). 
140 See id. at 857-60 (reviewing one decision by Justice Taft and elaborating on 
how difficult it would have been for any Supreme Court Justice to undertake a 
full historical inquiry into the relevant issues). 
141 See id. at 863 (contending that non-originalism exacerabates the danger that 
judges will “mistake their own predilections for the law”). 
142 Id.  
143 G.K. CHESTERTON, 4 COLLECTED WORKS 33-218 (1987) 
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world, the book evokes a version of Catholic Romantic 
Conservatism that would resonate with Justice Scalia.   
However, context matters.  The passage in question comes at 
the end of a chapter in which Chesterton advocates separate and 
decidedly distinct education for women.144   Here, I have to quote 
Chesterton at length, both because I am happy to have the 
opportunity to introduce him to new readers and because there is 
no way to do justice to his manner of reasoning without extended 
quotation. 
There was a time when you and I and all of us were all very 
close to God; so that even now the color of a pebble (or a 
paint), the smell of a flower (or a firework), comes to our 
hearts with a kind of authority and certainty; as if they were 
fragments of a muddled message, or features of a forgotten 
face.  To pour that fiery simplicity upon the whole of life is 
the only real aim of education; and closest to the child 
comes the woman – she understands.  To say what she 
understands is beyond me; save only this, that it is not a 
solemnity.  Rather it is a towering levity, an uproarious 
amateurishness of the universe, such as we felt when we 
were little, and would as soon sing as garden, as soon paint 
as run.  To smatter the tongues of men and angels, to 
dabble in the dreadful sciences, to juggle with pillars and 
pyramids and toss up the planets like balls, this is that inner 
audacity and indifference which the human soul, like a 
conjurer catching oranges, must keep up forever.  This is 
that insanely frivolous thing we call sanity.  And the 
elegant female, drooping her ringlets over her water-colors, 
knew it and acted on it.  She was juggling with frantic and 
flaming suns.  She was maintaining the bold equilibrium of 
inferiorities which is the most mysterious of superiorities 
and perhaps the most unattainable.  She was maintaining 
the prime truth of woman, the universal mother: that if a 
thing is worth doing, it is worth doing badly.145 
                                                        
144 Id. at 197-99. 
145 Id. at 199 
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This is an exquisite piece of writing, and it requires a lot of 
unpacking.  In what follows we focus only on the parts relevant to 
Justice Scalia’s use of Chesterton. 
One of Chesterton’s themes was the importance of maintaining 
the distinction between professionals and amateurs, or between 
generalists and specialists.146   There are occasions in life when 
men must adopt the role of experts and interact with others based 
on the status attached to their qualifications as experts.147  But most 
of the time, we partake of what Chesterton calls mankind’s 
“comrade-like aspect.”148  That is, we deal with one another as 
peers pursuing a common interest.  Chesterton supported an 
educated amateurism, and viewed specialization as the “peculiar 
peril” of his time giving rise to imperialism, tyranny and a host of 
other evils.149   
For women, he advocated only educated amateurism. 150  
Indeed, as indicated in the passage quoted above, he thought that 
women’s superiority lay precisely in their unconstrained 
amateurism.  He thought that women were the last link that men 
had to a time when all of us could engage in civilized 
amateurism.151 Indeed, it is clear from the passage quoted above 
that Chesterton placed great stock in amateurism and regarding 
                                                        
146 See id. at 110-114 (lamenting specialization not only of human activities  but 
of things, while associating univeralism with religion and specialization with 
separation and divorce); American Chesterton Society, A Thing Worth Doing, 
https://www.chesterton.org/a-thing-worth-doing/ (explicating Chesterton’s 
defense of amateurism against professionalism).   
147 See id. at 100-101 (associating specialization with the need for efficiency and 
quick action and pointing out that soldiers obey their military officers not in 
recognition of the officers’ superior moral or intellectual qualities but as a result 
of discipline and in recognition of their rank).   
148 Id. at 101. 
149 Id. at 102; see also id. at 103 (“The essential argument is ‘Specialists must be 
despots; men must be specialists. You cannot have equality in a soap factory; so 
you cannot have it anywhere. You cannot have comradeship in a wheat corner; 
so you cannot have it at all. We must have commercial civilization; therefore we 
must destroy democracy.’”)  
150  See id. at 119 (“observing that “the essential of the woman’s task is 
universality”). 
151 See id. at 114 (“But for women this ideal of comprehensive capacity (or 
common-sense) must long ago have been washed away.  It must have melted in 
the frightful furnaces of amibition and eager technicality.”). 
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women as the guardians of the realm of amateurism.  The most 
important things in life are the things worth doing badly. In its 
original context, Chesterton was advocating the raising and 
educating of one’s own children – or at least, he argued that 
women should raise and educate their own children, rather than 
working and sending their children to daycare.152   
Chesterton’s advice, quoted by Justice Scalia, applied to things 
like writing one’s own love letters and blowing one’s own nose.  
Such things, Chesterton argued, are worth doing badly. 153   
However, Justice Scalia applies the motto to his activities as a 
specialist.  And there the motto does not inspire confidence.  
Chesterton acknowledged the role of professions and understood 
that specialists have to do their jobs well. 
The democratic contention is that government (helping to rule 
the tribe) is a thing like falling in love, and not a thing like 
dropping into poetry. It is not something analogous to playing 
the church organ, painting on vellum, discovering the North Pole 
(that insidious habit), looping the loop, being Astronomer Royal, 
and so on. For these things we do not wish a man to do at all 
unless he does them well.154 
 
While Chesterton clearly thinks that democratic government is a 
thing of the common people, it should be clear that judicial 
interpretation of the law is not the same as democratic government.   
Justice Scalia could not claim that Supreme Court Justices act in 
the comrade-like aspect and not as specialists.  They are judges, 
not jurors.  Chesterton never intended his motto to be applied to a 
brain surgeon, a mechanical engineer or a federal judge 
If Justice Scalia has lost track of Chesterton’s argument in 
What’s Wrong with the World, we need not be concerned that the 
quoted aphorism comes in the context of an argument that would 
flunk the sniff test of constitutional Equal Protection  and in a book 
                                                        
152 See id. at 119 (arguing that “woman set to guard” two primary things: “one’s 
own children, one’s own altar” and that women went wrong when they 
transferred their “sacred stubbornness” for those things to the world of work). 
153 See G.K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 83-84 (1933) (linking doing such things 
for oneself to the common conception of democracy). 
154 Id. at 83. 
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that devotes one quarter of its pages to opposition to women’s 
suffrage.155   Originalism need not entail a formalism that would 
limit the meaning of the aphorism to Chesterton’s original 
meaning. However, that context may matter to us a great deal if 
Justice Scalia knew exactly the context in which the quotation 
appears: that is, in a book in which Chesterton rails against 
feminism, homosexuality, women’s suffrage, birth control, and 
divorce, among other things.156  Perhaps Justice Scalia’s invocation 
of Chesterton sotto vocce is a signal to those in the know that he 
wishes that he could vent his frustrations on these topics as freely 
as Chesterton did. 
But again, context matters. Justice Scalia has ripped the 
aphorism out of its context, much as common law judges are wont 
to elevate dicta to holdings and reduce holdings to dicta when it 
suits their purposes. The main problem with Justice Scalia’s use of 
Chesterton’s aphorism is that it actually enacts what happens when 
one does something worth doing – badly. Chesterton was not 
advocating amateurism among professionals, and why on earth 
would anybody recommend such a thing?  Deciding cases is the 
sort of activity about which Justice Thomas’s aphorism seems 
better to apply.  What possible purpose is served by a 
constitutional methodology that even a judge well-versed in the 
law could only apply badly?  Scalia has elided Chesterton’s binary 
opposition between acceptable methods for professionals and for 
amateurs, and in so doing he has imported the ethos of generalists 
into a realm that should be reserved for specialists.  
B. Justice Thomas: Originalism “Done Right” 
Being a Supreme Court Justice is something that even G.K. 
Chesterton would want to see done right.  But what does it mean to 
do such a thing right?  For Justices Thomas and Scalia, doing 
                                                        
155 G.K. CHESTERTON, 4 COLLECTED WORKS, at 107-47. 
156 See id. at 9 (General Editors’ Introduction) (“[Chesterton] knew that relaxed 
moral standards, eugenics, behavioral psychology, divorce, the feminist 
movement, birth control, scientism and abortion would lead to the 
dehumanization of man and the annihilation of the family.”); James V. Schall, 
S.J., Introduction, in id. at 11, 12 (regretting that many of the ideas against 
which Chesterton wrote – “from divorce to feminism to euthanasia to 
homosexuality to abortion have gained much of the day”). 
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constitutional adjudication right involves originalism, but for 
reasons discussed above in Part III, doing originalism right is 
challenging.  This brief discussion of Justice Thomas illustrates the 
interpretive challenges raised by Justice Thomas’s principled 
originalism. 
Justice Thomas invokes the slogan “any job worth doing is 
worth doing right” twice in his autobiography. 157   The first 
iteration comes when Justice Thomas is describing the refusal of 
his revered grandfather (to whom Justice Thomas refers as 
“Daddy”) to demonstrate any warmth or affection for Thomas or 
his brother, Myers.   
He never praised us, just as he never hugged us.  Whenever my 
grandmother urged him to tell us that we had done a good job, he 
replied, “That’s their responsibility.  Any job worth doing is 
worth doing right.”158 
 
This statement was on Justice Thomas’s mind, he tells us, as he 
took his oath of office and became a Justice of the Supreme Court. 
 
Struggling to control my surging emotions, I repeated the oath, 
thinking as I did so how Daddy and Aunt Tina [Daddy’s wife]159 
had raised me to fulfill it.  Any job worth doing, they had told 
me, is worth doing right.  This, I knew, was a job worth doing.160 
 
Justice Thomas clearly wants us to know that he aims to live by his 
grandfather’s words but also that he will not forget who his 
grandfather was and the milieu that his own determination helped 
him escape. 161  
                                                        
157 CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR (2007). 
158 Id. at 38. 
159 Although Justice Thomas refers to Aunt Tina as his grandmother, she was not 
a blood relation.  Justice Thomas’s mother was Daddy’s daughter, born out of 
wedlock with another woman.  Aunt Tina’s real name was “Christine,” and 
“Tina” is pronounced “Teenie.”  Id. at 13. 
160 Id. at 424. 
161 See id. at 39-40 (crediting Daddy, Aunt Tina and the nuns at his Catholic 
school for “opening doors of opportunity leading to a path that took me far from 
the cramped world into which I had been born. 
 36 
Justice Thomas relates his experience upon reading Robert 
Frost for the first time, and he excerpts for us a passage that he 
read as if it told his own story: Two roads diverged in a wood, and 
I -- / I took the one less traveled by, / And that has made all the 
difference. 162   Justice Thomas tells us that reading the poem 
“comforted me as I drifted farther from home,” reflecting his sense 
of himself as “the odd man out.”163   
Justice Thomas’s reading of the poem certainly resonates with 
his reading of his life.  He was a poor Black boy who aspired to be 
a Catholic priest and then went on to serve on the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  He also joined that Court as its most conservative member, 
hardly the road one would expect an African-American to take.  
Unfortunately, his reading of the poem does not resonate at all with 
the poem itself.  That is, Justice Thomas’s interpretation is at odds 
with clear markers of contrary meaning in the poem.164  Here it is 
in full:   
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,  
And sorry I could not travel both  
And be one traveler, long I stood  
And looked down one as far as I could  
To where it bent in the undergrowth;    
  
Then took the other, as just as fair, 
And having perhaps the better claim,  
Because it was grassy and wanted wear;  
Though as for that the passing there  
Had worn them really about the same, 
  
And both that morning equally lay  
In leaves no step had trodden black.  
Oh, I kept the first for another day!  
Yet knowing how way leads on to way,  
I doubted if I should ever come back. 
  
                                                        
162 Id. at 50.   
163 CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR 54 (2007). 
164 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. PRITCHARD, FROST: A LITERARY LIFE RECONSIDERED 
127-28 (1984) (“For the large moral meaning which ‘The Road Not Taken’ 
seems to endorse . . . does not maintain itself when the poem is looked at more 
carefully. . . ”). 
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I shall be telling this with a sigh  
Somewhere ages and ages hence:  
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—  
I took the one less traveled by,  
And that has made all the difference.165 
 
Thomas’s reading of the poem, evidenced by the way he has 
excerpted it, is consistent with the most common interpretation of 
the poem, an interpretation that is clearly at odds with the plain 
meaning of the text.  This reading ignores the poem’s two middle 
stanzas and thus overlooks the profound irony of the final stanza. 
The facts of the poem clearly contradict any claim that the 
poem’s narrator took the road less traveled by or that such a choice 
could have made any difference.  The narrator expressly and 
repeatedly tells us that the two roads were equally traveled by:  
both are worn “about the same,” both “that morning equally lay in 
leaves no step had trodden black.”  The poem clearly announces 
that nothing momentous turned on the traveler’s arbitrary choice. 
Yes Justice Thomas follows the more-traveled-by reading of 
Frost.166  Frost’s poem is often excerpted in precisely the way that 
Justice Thomas has done. 167   People, seeking to reaffirm their 
commitment to their self-conception as mavericks who follow their 
self-appointed paths, place the last stanza of Frost’s poem (or parts 
of it) on greeting cards or pin it to bulletin boards.  But the fact that 
that Justice Thomas’s interpretation of Frost is a common 
misreading should give this originalist little solace.  Excerpting the 
poem as Justice Thomas has done violates contextual canons 
enunciated by none other than Justice Scalia,168 and there is no 
reason to think the two men differ as to canons of construction.  
                                                        
165 THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 105 (Edward Connery Lathem, ed. 1979). 
166 See DAVID ORR: THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: FINDING AMERICA IN THE POEM 
EVERYONE LOVES AND ALMOST EVERYONE GETS WRONG  3-7 (2015) 
(compiling evidence of the poem’s popularity but noting that “almost everyone 
gets it wrong”). 
167 See, e.g., PRITCHARD, at 125-26 (citing the high-minded use of the poem 
Alexander Meiklejohn of Amherst College in his essay “What the College Is”). 
168  ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS (2012). 
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Texts should be construed as a whole,169 every word and provision 
should be given effect, 170  and the words of a text should be 
interpreted so as to make them compatible, not contradictory.171  
One might object that we are dealing here with a literary and not a 
legal text, but it is hard to imagine why these particular interpretive 
canons would not apply with the same force to a literary text. 
The poem clearly mocks the narrator’s self-regard in the final 
stanza and in fact, as the critic William Pritchard points out, the 
complicated twists of the poem are what make it “un-boring.”172  
The poem is not at all about what Justice Thomas takes it to be 
about – choosing the unusual path for oneself.  It is more about 
what Justice Thomas, in writing his autobiography, is engaged in – 
self-mythologizing 173  – but Justice Thomas lacks Frost’s ironic 
frame of mind, at least in this context.  And that makes all the 
difference. 
Questioning Justice Thomas’s skills as a literary critic may 
seem uncharitable, but Justice Thomas’s approach to constitutional 
interpretation places a premium on the judge’s ability to discern 
the meaning of texts.  His misreading of Frost illustrates the sorts 
of hermeneutic slip-ups to which the judge as critic or as law-
office historian will often be vulnerable.  His misreading of Frost 
suggests that Justice Thomas might be capable of misreading other 
texts, including the text of his own life.  To take just one example, 
I want to look a bit more carefully at Justice Thomas’s relationship 
to Yale Law School. 
In his autobiography, Justice Thomas introduces the theme of 
the contrast, learned from Daddy, between rattlesnakes and water 
moccasins.  Both are deadly, but rattlesnakes warn you with their 
rattle, while water moccasins strike without warning. 174   This 
distinction becomes Justice Thomas’s key metaphor for 
                                                        
169 See id., Canon 24 (whole text canon) 
170 See id., Canon 26 (surplusage canon)  
171 See id., Canon 27 (harmonious reading canon) 
172 PRITCHARD, at 128. 
173 See ORR, at 9 (summing up the scholarly consensus that poem is not “a salute 
to can-do individualism” but “a commentary on the self-deception we practice 
when constructing the story of our own lives”). 
174 THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON, at 68. 
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understanding the different types of bigotry to which he is 
subjected throughout his life.  He could deal with the open bigotry 
of the segregated South, but the deception of the liberal white 
establishment posed the far greater danger.175  At the height of the 
Anita Hill controversy, Justice Thomas reflects on lynch mobs 
(rattlesnakes) and sanctimonious liberals (water moccasins): 
As a child in the Deep South, I’d grown up fearing the lynch 
mobs of the Ku Klux Klan; as an adult, I was starting to wonder 
if I’d been afraid of the wrong white people all along.  My worst 
fears had come to pass not in Georgia but in Washington, D.C., 
where I was being pursued not by bigots in white robes but by 
left-wing zealots draped in flowing sanctimony.  For all the fear 
I’d known as a boy in Savannah, this was the first time I’d found 
myself at the mercy of people who would do whatever they 
could to hurt me. . . .176 
 
Yale Law School appears in Justice Thomas’s memoir as the 
biggest water moccasin of them all.177   
He provides no concrete examples of discriminatory conduct, 
but he tells us that, right from the start, he felt out of place.178  
Although he recognized that he was out of place more because he 
was disadvantaged than because he was Black, Justice Thomas 
                                                        
175 See id. at 109-10 (preferring white southerners’ “open bigotry” to that of the 
“ostensibly unprejudiced whites who pretended to side with black people while 
using them to further their own political and social ends”).  
176 Id. at 378. 
177 See id. at 110 (regretting that, having gotten in to Yale while disclosing his 
race, he “had stepped within striking distance” of the water moccasin).  After 
not being able to find a job during his third year in law school, a failure Justice 
Thomas attributes to the fact that his Yale degree “bore the taint of racial 
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178 Id. at 107.  His antipathy towards Yale Law School at times takes in all of 
New England, which he found subject to a “herd mentality” when it came to 
political perspectives.  Id. at 142. But Justice Thomas also provides evidence 
that Yale was not the ideological monolith he paints it to be.  It was there that he 
met John Bolton, and his key Republican supporter, John Danforth, is also a 
Yale Law School alumnus.  While working for Danforth in Missouri, Thomas 
reads Thomas Sewell with interest for the first time, but he had already been 
introduced to Sewell while he was at Yale.  Someone gave him a Sewell book at 
Yale, which he “skimmed angrily and threw . . . into the trash, furious that any 
black man could think like that.”  Id. at 155.  
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believed that ultimately the stigma that attached to his admission to 
law school based on affirmative action 179  could never be 
eliminated regardless of his academic success.180 After graduating, 
Justice Thomas boasts that he “peeled a fifteen-cent price sticker 
off of a package of cigars and struck it to the frame of” his Yale 
law degree to symbolize his “disillusionment” with the fact that 
“Yale meant one thing for white graduates and another for 
blacks.”181 
Yet his memoir also provides ample evidence of the benefits he 
derived not from his Yale Law School education but from having 
gone to Yale.  He landed his first summer job during law school – 
the only one he applied for and the only one he wanted 182  – 
because his Yale classmate, Lani Guinier, helped him “obtain a 
$60-a-week Law Students Civil Rights Research Council grant 
from the Legal Defense Fund” so that he might do so.183  During 
his third year in law school, Justice Thomas applied to work for 
Missouri’s Attorney General John Danforth because he had heard 
that Danforth was “looking for other Yalies to work for him.”184   
John Danforth also found a place for Thomas to live rent-free 
while he was studying for the bar185 and secured a loan for him 
when he defaulted on his student loans.186   
Through John Danforth’s contacts, and now on the strength of 
his fine performance in the Missouri Attorney General’s office, 
Justice Thomas was able to move into a far better-paying job with 
the Monsanto Corporation.187  That job proved short-lived.  Justice 
Thomas expresses some concern about the harms corporations like 
                                                        
179 Contemplating liberal opposition to his nomination to become a Supreme 
Court Justice, Justice Thomas muses, “Had I been a liberal, they would have 
overlooked my youth and comparative inexperience, not to mention the fact that 
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181 Id. at 144. 
182 Id. at 117-118. 
183 Id. at 117.  The law firm paid an additional $40/week.  Id.  
184 Id. at 127. 
185 Id. at 129. 
186 Id. at 147.   
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Monsanto caused to ordinary working people, but it seems he was 
simply not interested in the work at Monsanto – and there wasn’t 
enough for him to do there to keep him occupied.188  In any case, 
John Danforth, now a Senator, once again rescued Justice Thomas 
by inviting him to join the Senator’s staff in Washington, D.C.189  
A few years after moving to the capital, Justice Thomas 
determined that he could no longer remain in his marriage.  With 
great reluctance and tormented by guilty feelings, he left his wife 
and child.  He moved in with a friend from Yale Law School.190 As 
Scott Gerber put it, “Thomas’s association with Danforth would 
later prove to be the most important in his professional career.”191  
Without Yale, Justice Thomas’s career would have looked very 
different. 
All of this evidence is presented in Justice Thomas’s 
autobiography, and it suggests that Justice Thomas grossly 
misreads the importance of Yale Law School to his career.  He 
does so in a manner consistent with his misreading of Frost.  That 
is, the autobiography insists on Justice Thomas’s outlier status as a 
self-made man and resists any suggestion that institutions such as 
Yale, affirmative action, and the federal government itself might 
have played important roles.  Nor does he acknowledge that he was 
the beneficiary of the support of political allies eager to push 
forward the career of a young Black conservative.  The 
autobiography suggests that, while Justice Thomas took a less-
traveled by road, that road would look very different to an outside 
observer than it does to Justice Thomas. 
Aside from the obligatory acknowledgement of youthful 
indiscretions, Justice Thomas’s autobiography does not evidence 
                                                        
188 See id. at 166-70 (explaining how he realized that one of his neighbors when 
he was a child likely suffered symptoms associated with exposure to creosote, 
complaining that there was not enough work for him to do at Monsanto, and 
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189 Id. at 173-74. 
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191  SCOTT GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE 
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extensive self-critical reflection.   Not coincidentally, the self-
critical moment is precisely what is missing in today’s originalism.  
The result can be a form of robust judicial activism that differs 
from older forms of judicial activism in its justification but not in 
its results: the reversal of legislative enactments by five men (the 
women dissent) in robes. As Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson noted in 
his critique of Heller,192 conservatives may win certain battles in 
overturning legislation that they find objectionable, but in doing 
so, they undermine the very conservative principles that gave rise 
to the ideology of originalism in constitutional interpretation – 
separation of powers, judicial restraint, textualism and 
federalism.193  Now only originalism remains.194  
V. Conclusion: The Future of an Illusion 
In Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents, he summarizes his 
earlier work, The Future of an Illusion, which is on the subject of 
religious belief.195  Freud calls religious belief “patently infantile” 
and “foreign to reality,” but he also concedes that “the great 
majority of mortals will never be able to rise above this view of 
life.” 196   So the non-originalist might conclude with respect to 
originalism.  Even as originalism in its scholarly form grows more 
sophisticated and multi-valent, popular originalism thrives as a 
blunt instrument used to constrain activist (read “liberal”) 
judges.197  As Thomas Colby points out, “Originalism somehow 
continues to thrive as both a political movement and as a scholarly 
theory, even though the features that make it attractive as a 
political movement render it impotent as a scholarly theory and 
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vice versa.”198 
My conclusion is somewhat different.  The future of 
originalism as a popular movement that exerts a normative pull on 
judges to adhere to the written text of the Constitution is bright but 
illusory.  Politicians and judges can easily adjust their rhetoric to 
nourish that populist notion of what constitutional adjudication 
ought to be.  However regardless of their rhetoric, judges will 
continue to be constrained, not by the written text of the 
Constitution, but by the main sources of human malaise that Freud 
identified in Civilization and Its Discontents: the outside world, 
their own bodily infirmities (here of the cognitive variety), and 
other people.199  
The world will continue to confront judges with novel 
situations and textual meaning will continue to run out, leaving the 
judges to their own devices for constitutional adjudication.  Judges 
of good will and intention will continue to render decisions in the 
name of originalism that will be subject to lively criticisms.   Some 
of those criticisms will focus on the faulty methodology, 
subjectivism, tendentious interpretation, and incomplete historical 
evidence and thus point out the judge’s intellectual limitations.  
Other criticisms will evidence the continuing debate between 
origianlism and non-originalism.  People on both sides of the 
divide have entrenched positions, and neither side is going away.  
Originalism’s rhetorical advantages suggest that its adherents will 
become increasingly confident of the judiciary’s ability to do the 
job right. Increasily, its chief practitioners have lost sight of Justice 
Scalia’s fundamental insight that originalism is something that 
federal judges can only do badly.   
                                                        
198 Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 
716 (2011) 
199 See FREUD, CIVILIZATION, at 26, 37. 
